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ABSTRACT 
 
Simeck, a lightweight block cipher has been proposed to be one of the encryption that can be employed in 
the Internet of Things (IoT) applications. Therefore, this paper presents the security of the Simeck32/64 
block cipher against side-channel cube attack. We exhibit our attack against Simeck32/64 using the 
Hamming weight leakage assumption to extract linearly independent equations in key bits. We have been 
able to find 32 linearly independent equations in 32 key variables by only considering the second bit from 
the LSB of the Hamming weight leakage of the internal state on the fourth round of the cipher. This enables 
our attack to improve previous attacks on Simeck32/64 within side-channel attack model with better time 
and data complexity of 235 and 211.29 respectively. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Internet of Things (IoT) is another improvement of information technology. Internet of things 
connects not only the computer devices but also the living things like plants, people and animals 
[26]. The number of connected devices is increasing rapidly that can lead to both opportunity and 
threats. Therefore, the security of IoT has become a crucial concern among the researcher over 
the world. Haroon et al. [27] have addressed the technical challenges of IoT. Due to constraints 
such as connection setup, energy, power, and storage in IoT connected devices; a lightweight 
encryption is required to secure the IoT communication (see Figure 1). Therefore, this paper 
presents the approach and security analysis of a to-be IoT encryption.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Security landscape of IoT 
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Simeck32/64 [1] is a lightweight block cipher that was designed based on the combination of 
good design components from SIMON and SPECK block ciphers [2]. It is an Addition-Rotation-
XOR lightweight block cipher. However, Simeck block cipher does not have the modular 
operation. Nalla et al. have analyzed Simeck32/64 by using fault attack and 16 bits of the last 
round key have been recovered successfully [3]. As presented in Table 1 in [1], the hardware 
implementations of the Simeck block cipher family are even smaller than our implementations of 
SIMON in terms of area and power consumption. The design rationale of the Simeck block cipher 
suits the requirement of IoT embedded devices such as in RFID tags. In a fault attack, it is 
assumed that there is a fault occurred during the encryption. However, in the side-channel cube 
attack, it is assumed that there is a leakage occurred in the cryptosystem. Therefore, in this paper, 
by using the proposed framework with Hamming-weight leakage bit after four rounds of 
encryption, this attack has been able to decrease the time complexity of the previous results to 235 
computations.  
 
Cube attack is a generic type of algebraic attack introduced by Dinur and Shamir at 
EUROCRYPT in 2009 [4]. Most of the cryptosystems can be represented by a system of 
multivariate polynomial equations over a finite field, GF(2) .To apply a cube attack, the adversary 
requires a black-box access to a target cryptosystem and it is assumed that the adversary has an 
access to a bit of information from the cryptosystem. The obtained information from the 
cryptosystem enables the adversary to achieve the goal of cube attack which is the adversary can 
derive low-degree equations that can be exploited for constructing the distinguishers [5] and key 
recovery attack [4]. When using the original cube attack [4], the adversary tries to derive 
independent linear equations over secret variables of the cryptosystem. The system of several 
linear equations can be easily solved to recover the value of the secret variables by using the 
Gaussian Elimination. Several lightweight block ciphers have been analysed susceptible to cube 
attacks such as KATAN [6], NOEKEON [7] and PRESENT [8][9]. The cube attack presented in 
this chapter is motivated by the observation of SIMON (Beaulieu et al., 2013) and KATAN [10] 
family of block ciphers against algebraic cube attack [6]. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. View of Security Analysis 
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Our contribution. In this paper, we propose the employing of Hamming-weight leakage model 
in cube attack on Simeck32/64. By using this attack model, more sub key bits have been able to 
be recovered; therefore, our method has been able to improve the previous time complexity from 
248 to 235 in the side-channel model of attack (see Figure 2 for the focus of this analysis). 
 
2. RELATED WORKS 
 
Simeck is a block cipher designed based on SIMON [1]. SIMON [2] and KATAN [10] have been 
analyzed using dynamic cube attack [6] in standard model of attack. In the attack, the researchers 
use a cube tester which is positioned at the middle of the cipher. The cube tester is extended in 
two directions over the maximum possible upper and lower rounds provided that some of sub key 
bits are successfully guessed. The automated algorithm in dynamic cube attack can be realized 
and the results show that the method can break 118 and 155 out of 254 rounds of KATAN32 in 
the non-full codebook and full-codebook attack scenarios, respectively. For SIMON32/64, they 
are able to break 17 and 22 out of 32 rounds, in the same scenarios. In addition, in 2013, [11] and 
[12] have analyzed SIMON with differential and linear cryptanalysis.  
 
Dinur and Shamir have proposed a side-channel attack model [4]. In the side-channel model, the 
adversary is assumed to have access to only a bit of information (a leakage bit) about the internal 
state of the block cipher after each round. The one bit of information can be a single bit of the 
internal state or a Hamming-weight bit from the internal state. Dinur and Shamir [4] have shown 
that by using cube attack in the single-bit-leakage side-channel model can recover the secret key 
of the AES [13] and [14] and SERPENT block ciphers much easier than the previously known 
side-channel attacks. Yang et al. have investigated PRESENT block cipher using side-channel 
cube attack [8]. A year later, the side-channel cube attack has been applied to NOEKEON [9] and 
PRESENT [7][8][15]. For the NOEKEON block cipher, the complexity of the previous attack is 
reduced to 268 computations in single-bit leakage model. 60 linearly independent equations over 
99 key variables have been extracted successfully. Meanwhile, for the PRESENT block cipher, 
Abdul-Latip et al. [7] have been able to reduce the attack complexity to 216 computations with 218 
chosen plaintexts for PRESENT-128 and 264 with 218 chosen plaintexts.  
 
Simeck is a newly introduced cipher in 2015 [1]. Since proposed, [22] [16] [17] and [18] have 
analyzed Simeck by using linear, differential and impossible differential cryptanalysis too. Later, 
Zhang et al. [19] and [20] have analyzed Simeck family of block ciphers by using integral 
cryptanalysis method. The attacks have been able to obtain 12/14/16-round theoretical integral 
distinguishers on Simeck32/48/64 and some 15-round experimental integral distinguishers on 
Simeck32. In addition, Xiang et. al. [21] also analyzed Simeck by using integral cryptanalysis and 
15, 18 and 21-round distinguishers are found for Simeck32/64, Simeck48/96 and Simeck64/128 
respectively. Nalla et al. [3] have investigated Simeck using fault analysis. Firstly, the researchers 
have applied random bit-flip fault attack and n-bits of the last round key of Simeck have been 
recovered by using about n/2 faults. Secondly, a random byte fault attack is used and the attack 
was able to recover the n-bit of last round key of Simeck using about n/6.5 faults.  
 
Therefore, one of the contributions of this paper is providing the security analysis of the 
Simeck32/64 block cipher against side-channel cube attack. Table 1 shows some results of 
security analysis on Simeck32/64 against several cryptanalytic methods in side-channel and the 
standard model of attack. 
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Table 1. Some results of security analysis on Simeck32/64. 
 
 
3. DESCRIPTION OF SIMECK32/64 
 
Simeck32/64 is a variant of Simeck family of block ciphers (cf. [1] for detailed the explanation 
about the Simeck block cipher). The design of Simeck32/64 is based on Feistel and Addition-
Rotation-XOR (ARX) network which adopted some good components of two NSA ciphers, 
SIMON and SPECK. The block cipher accepts 32 bits plaintext as the input, 64 bits secret key 
and 32 rounds for a complete encryption process. In each round, 16-bit sub key is required for the 
encryption.  
 
 
Figure 3. Structure of Simeck for round “i” 
 
Based on the results obtained in a study [18] that has been conducted on the SIMON block cipher, 
Kolbl and Roy [18] explicitly state the Simeck32/64 block cipher requires 8 rounds to achieve full 
diffusion; means that each bit at the input affects all bits of the output. The Simeck key schedule 
is designed using SPECK round function. There are six operations in a round of Simeck round 
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function; ANDing, Rotate left 5 bits, Rotate left 1 bit, three XORing operations (the intermediate 
state with round key) and finally the swapping process which is immediately takes place before 
the next round. Figure 3 shows the structure of Simeck at round “i”. 
 
4. CUBE ATTACK 
 
Cube attack is a generic type of algebraic attack (higher order differential) that was proposed by 
Dinur and Shamir at EUROCRYPT 2009 [4]. The aim of the cube attack is to recover the secret 
key in a cryptosystem by extracting and solving linearly independent algebra equations [4]. For a 
well designed cipher, an algebraic representation over GF(2) is of degreed the cube attack will 
require about 2d computations. [5] have analyzed the Trivium [10] stream cipher using cube 
attack. In the cube attack, if the degree of the master polynomial is relatively low, then it is 
possible for the adversary to analysze the cipher faster than by the exhaustive search (brute force 
attack).  
 
Table 2. The summation of the master polynomial, p. 
 
The cube attack has a weakness in a case when the degree of the polynomial is too high because 
the degree that representing a ciphertext bit grows exponentially with the number of rounds in the 
cipher. Therefore, for a block cipher, the application of cube attack usually becomes ineffective 
after a few rounds if the adversary executes in a standard attack model. To get a better result 
using cube attack, the adversary should derive enough number of linearly independent equations 
which are solvable by Gaussian elimination. However, when considering the practical 
implementations of a block cipher, in an embedded system (limited in terms of resources and 
power) such as smart cards, the cube attack will become a stronger attack if implemented in side-
channel attack model (cf. next section for more details about side-channel cube attack).  
 
In the real attack, the adversary is able to access to some (leakage) information from the internal 
state of the cipher. This information can be the timing, electrical power consumption, 
electromagnetic radiation and probing. Using cube attack, the main observation is, the summation 
of p (p is the multivariate master polynomial p(v1,…….vn, k1……..kn) which representing the 
output bits of an encryption algorithm over GF(2)) over tI (a monomial term that containing 
multiplication of all variable in I; I ⊆ {1, ..., ℓ} where ℓ = m (length of plaintext variable) + n 
(length of key variables)) by assigning all the possible combinations of ‘0’ and ‘1’ to all variable 
in I and the other value is fixed. By summing the polynomial p over all possible value of variable 
in tI requires the polynomial to be summed over an even number of times. Consider the following 
summation (as presented in Table 2) of the given master polynomial p(x1, x2, x3, x4, x5) = x1 x2 
x3 x4 + x3 x4 + x3 + x4 x5 + x1 x3 + x2 x3 by choosing I = {1, 2, 3}. 
 
 
To execute cube attack, firstly, ignore the distinction between the secret and public variables’ 
notations by denoting all variables by xi , • • • , xℓ, where ℓ = m + n. Let I ⊆ {1, ..., ℓ} be a subset 
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of the variable indexes, and tI denote a monomial term containing multiplication of all the xis 
with i ∈ I . For cube attack, if the master polynomial p is factorized by the monomial tI, then the 
resulted equation is shown in Equation 1. 
 
p(x1, …, xℓ ) = tI  • pS(I) + q(x1, …, xℓ ) (1) 
where pS(I), is called the superpoly of tI in p, which does not have any common variable with tI , 
and each monomial term tI in the remainder polynomial, denoted by q will miss at least one 
variable from tI. Meanwhile, tI is called a “maxterm” if its superpoly in p is linear polynomial 
which is not a constant (for instance; degree of pS(I) is equal to1). For cube attack, the main 
observation is that, if the summation of polynomial p over tI by assigning all the possible 
combinations of 0 or 1 values to the xi with i ∈ I and fixing the value of all the remaining xi  with 
i not in I , the resultant polynomial equals to pS(I) of mod 2. For instance, given a master 
polynomial p is as follows; 
 
p(x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7) = x1 x2 x3 + x1 x2 x3 x4 + x2 x4 x6 + x1 x2 x3 x5 x7 
Then, choose a subset I = {1, 2, 3} where tI = x1 x2 x3 and the resulted tweakable polynomial (as 
in Equation 1) will be 
 
p(x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7) = x1 x2 x3 (1 + x4) + (x2 x4 x6 + x5 x7) 
Theorem 1 (The Main Observation [4][7]). Given a master polynomial p over GF(2) with ℓ 
variables, and any index subset I ⊆ {1, • • • , ℓ}, then  pI = pS(I ). 
 
Given an access to a cryptographic function with public and secret variables, from this 
observation, the adversary is able to recover the value of the secret variables (ki) in two phases, 
namely preprocessing and online phase. In the preprocessing phase, firstly, the adversary has to 
find sufficient number of maxterms, tI, such that each tI consists of a subset of public variables 
v1, • • • , vm . To find the maxterms, the adversary has to conduct a linearity test such as BLR 
[23] on pS(I) over the secret variables ki ∈ {k1, • • • , kn} and the value of the public variables 
which is not in tI are fixed (to 0 or 1). To conduct this test, the adversary has to choose a 
sufficient number of vectors x and y ∈ {0, 1}n independently and uniformly at random 
representing samples of n-bit key. Then, for each pair of vectors x and y, the adversary has to sum 
the polynomial p over tI to verify whether or not each one of the vectors satisfies Equation 2. If 
all the vectors x and y satisfy Equation 2, with high probability pS(I) is linear over the secret key 
variables. The next step is to derive linearly independent equations in the secret variables ki from 
pS(I). By having and solving these linearly independent equations, the adversary can obtain the 
values of the cipher key. 
 
pS(I) [0] + pS(I)[x] + pS(I) [y] = pS(I)[x + y]      (2) 
The preprocessing is completed if the adversary has gather sufficient number of linearly 
independent equations in key variables. In the online phase, the adversary is required find the 
value of the right-hand side of each linear equation by summing the black box polynomial, p over 
the same set of maxterms tIs which have been obtained in the preprocessing phase. Finally, the 
adversary can recover the value of cipher key by solving the linear equations using the Gaussian 
Elimination. 
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5. A REVIEW ON SIDE-CHANNEL CUBE ATTACK 
 
Side-channel cube attack [24] is a hybrid attack that tries to exploit the implementation of full 
rounds cryptosystem by manipulating the intermediate round information leakage and extend the 
attack until the last round of the side-channel attack. If the cipher is not properly implemented 
(especially if the cipher is implemented in an embedded system), by using side-channel cube 
attack, the adversary is able to access a bit of information of the cipher. Hence, the side-channel 
cube attack can be a real threat to many block ciphers, such as KATAN [25], NOEKEON [9] and 
PRESENT [8][7]. In the pre-processing phase of side-channel cube attack, there are two main 
tasks; firstly, the adversary has to determine the efficient round to launch the attack and secondly, 
the adversary has to find the maxterm equations. To determine the efficient round, the adversary 
has to determine the number of key variables in master polynomial after each round (cf. [9] for 
further description on how to determine the number of key variables). It is recommended to 
choose round where the cipher achieves full diffusion. If the full diffusion occurred in the cipher, 
more secret variables can be obtained. In the side-channel attack model, the attack can be 
launched at any round of the cipher. Next, in the online phase, the adversary has to recover the 
value of key variables. 
 
6. SIDE-CHANNEL CUBE ATTACK ON SIMECK32/64 
 
This section explains the side-channel cube attack against Simeck32/64 using the Hamming-
weight leakage model. In order to apply the Hamming-weight leakage side-channel cube attack 
on the Simeck32/64 block cipher, firstly, the adversary needs to find out the round in which the 
cipher begins achieving complete diffusion. This enables the adversary to find most of the key 
variables from low degree master polynomials in early rounds of the encryption process. Based 
on Yang et al. [8], the Simeck32/64 block cipher achieves full diffusion after rounds and the 
Simeck block cipher is claimed susceptible to any algebraic attack after 5 rounds of encryption. 
However, the degree of master polynomials after 8 rounds is very high which is not suitable for 
our side-channel attack model. In addition, as mentioned in the Simeck proposal [1], the degree of 
the polynomial of the Simeck block cipher (any variant) after 5 rounds is 13. Therefore, in this 
study, the attack is executed by considering the Hamming-weight leakage after 4 rounds of 
encryption to extract sufficiently many maxterms.  
 
As in Definition 1, in this study, the value of the Hamming-weight of the internal state after 4 
rounds is represented 8-bit binary form by considering all bits starting from LSB position towards 
the MSB position. In this attack, in order to search for sufficient maxterms, two cube sizes are 
applied (6 and 8) and the second bit of the Hamming-weight is chosen. 
 
Definition 1 [7] Let B represents the internal state of the cipher and B = bβ-1 …b0 be the binary 
string of length β bits. The Hamming-weight of B is the number of bits with value 1 in the binary 
representation of B, which can be computed as HW(B) =  and has a value between 0 and 
β. The LSB of HW(B) is the XOR of all bits from B and the MSB of HW(B) is the AND of all 
bits in B. Meanwhile, each bit in the between is a Boolean function in which the degree increases 
as the bit position gets closer to the MSB. 
 
In order to know whether a particular selected monomial tI is a maxterm, this study applies the 
same BLR test as used in [9][7] with 300 random vectors. The framework of the side-channel 
cube attack on the Simeck32/64 block cipher is designed based on HW-SCCA in [15]. The 
framework has been designed using the Hamming-weight leakage model.  There are two phases 
of attack namely, pre-processing phase and the online phase of attack. Firstly, in the pre-
processing phase, random vectors (consists of key and plaintext) are input into the Simeck 
cryptographic algorithm. Then, the cipher is run and the internal states after each round have been 
archived for the determination of Hamming-weight. In this side-channel model, it is 
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recommended that the most ideal Hamming-weight leakage is in the round with which the cipher 
begins achieving complete diffusion. This enables the adversary to find most of the key variables 
from low degree master polynomials in early rounds of the encryption process.  
 
 
Figure 4. The proposed side-channel cube attack using Hamming-weight leakage model 
 
As in Definition 1, in this study, the value of the Hamming-weight of the internal state after 4 
rounds is represented in 8-bit binary form by considering all bits starting from LSB position 
towards the MSB position. Once the adversary has been able to collect Hamming-weight, in order 
to extract linear maxterm equation, 2nd LSB of Hamming-weight has to be determined. In cube 
attack, to check whether a particularly selected monomial tI is a maxterm, this study applies the 
same BLR test as used in [7]. Finally, in the online phase, the adversary needs to solve all 
maxterm equations in order to recover secret keys. In the designed framework, Gaussian 
Elimination is recommended to be used. 
 
In our study, the framework (see Figure 4) has been executed using simulation on several laptops 
with a running C program. Each of the laptops has been installed with a running C program with 
respective cube size. The recovered maxterm equations are save into text files (.txt) which then 
analyzed with Gaussian Elimination.  
 
7. FINDINGS OF THE SIDE-CHANNEL CUBE ATTACK ON SIMECK32/64 
 
After running the preprocessing phase of the attack for several weeks, thousands of maxterm 
equations using different cubes sizes have been collected, where most of them were found to be 
redundant and linearly dependent equations. To filter the equations and obtain only linearly 
independent equations among them, MATLAB and Gaussian Elimination are used. The 
elimination gives us only 32 linearly independent equations over 32 key variables. Table 3 shows 
the indexes of variables in the maxterms and the corresponding linearly independent equations 
that have been obtained. In this study, the indexes for both the plaintext and the key variables start 
from index 0, namely the MSB, until 63 (LSB). The total time complexity to find the correct 64-
bit key reduces to 235 compared to the 264 for an exhaustive key search attack (brute force). 
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Table 3. Results of side-channel cube attack on Simeck32/64. 
 
 
 
As shown in Table 3, after four rounds (as shown in Figure 5(a)) of encryption, the maxterms 
start to appear within tIs of size 6; there are 31 maxterms of size 6 and 1 maxterm of size 8. Based 
on Figure 5(b), most of the sub keys are found within the cube size of 6. Hence, the total number 
of the chosen plaintexts for the online phase of the cube attack is (31 × 26) + (1 × 28) ≈ 211.2855 by 
considering 32 linearly independent equations over the 32 key variables. 
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(b) Total of solvable maxterm equation and sub key bits after 4 rounds 
encryption based on cube size 
 
Figure 5. The appearance of sub key bits in solvable linear maxterm equation and in Simeck32/64 
 
As the result, by using Hamming-weight leakage assumption in our side-channel cube attack on 
Simeck32/64, there are more sub key bits have been recovered compared to other method of 
attack in side-channel model (full round attack). The conventional method is the adversary has to 
recover the exact target bit in the internal state. Using Hamming-weight, the adversary has to 
calculate the Hamming-weight of the internal state only (more relax). Our findings show that the 
security evaluation on Simeck32/64 has been improved in terms of the time and data complexity. 
The analysis of side-channel attack on a block cipher is important for the considerations in the 
cryptosystem implementation. So, the implementer of the cryptosystem should prevent 
information from a leakage. Table 4 shows the comparison of results on Simeck32/64 in side-
channel attack model. Other results are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 4. Comparison of results on Simeck32/64 in side-channel attack model. 
 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper discusses the security of the Simeck32/64 block cipher against cube attacks with 
Hamming-weight leakage assumption in the side-channel attack model. The analysis shows that 
the attack can recover half of the 64-bit key of the cipher, by considering a Hamming-weight 
leakage bit (second LSB bit) from the internal state after the 4 rounds, with 235 computations. The 
attack has been able to find 32 linearly independent equations over 32 key variables. However, 
there are some nonlinear equations of low degree (of degree 2) found during the analysis which 
may further reduce the complexity of the attack. To be implemented in IoT applications, further 
analysis is required.  In addition to this study, further research and investigation on the other two 
variants of the Simeck family of block ciphers are strongly recommended. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
This work was supported by Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM) Malaysia under SLAB 
cholarship and Fundamental Research Grant Scheme of UTEM  
FRGS/1/2015/ICT05/FTMK/02/F00293 funded by Ministry of Higher Education, Malaysia. 
 
 
k30 k0 - k29 
k31 
 
International Journal of Computer Networks & Communications (IJCNC) Vol.10, No.4, July 2018 
89 
REFERENCES 
 
[1] G. Yang, B. Zhu, V. Suder, M. Aagaard, G. Gong, The Simeck Family of Lightweight Block Ciphers, 
CHES 2015. LNCS 9293 (2015) 307-329. 
 
[2] R. Beaulieu, D. Shors, J. Smith, S. Treatman-   Clark, B. Weeks, L. Wingers, The SIMON and 
SPECK Families of Lightweight Block Ciphers Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2013/404. 
 
[3] V. Nalla, R. Sahu, V. Saraswat, Differential Fault Attack on SIMECK, Proceedings of the Third 
Workshop on Cryptography and Security in Computing Systems (2016) 45-48. 
 
[4] I. Dinur, A. Shamir, Cube Attacks on Tweakable Black Box Polynomials, EUROCRYPT 2009. 
LNCS 5479 (2009) 278-299. 
 
[5] J. Aumasson, I. Dinur, M. Meier, A. Shamir, Cube Testers and Key Recovery Attacks on Reduced-
round MD6 and Trivium, FSE 2009. LNCS 5665 (2009) 307-329. 
 
[6] Z. Ahmadian, S. Rasoolzadeh, M. Salmasizadeh, M. Aref, Automated Dynamic Cube Attack on 
Block Ciphers: Cryptanalysis of SIMON and KATAN, Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2015/040. 
 
[7] S.F. Abdul-Latip, M. Reyhanitabar, W. Susilo, J. Seberry, Extended Cubes: Enhancing the Cube 
Attack by Extracting Low-Degree Non-Linear Equations, ASIACCS 2011 (2011) 296-305. 
 
[8] L. Yang, M. Wang, S. Qiao, Side Channel Cube Attack on PRESENT, CANS 2009. LNCS 5888 
(2009) 379-391. 
 
[9] S.F. Abdul-Latip, M. Reyhanitabar, W. Susilo, J. Seberry, On the Security of NOEKEON against 
Side Channel Cube Attacks, ISPEC 2010, LNCS 6047 (2010) 45-55. 
 
[10] C. Canniere, O. Dunkelman, M. Knezevic, KATAN and KTANTAN-A Family of Small and Efficient 
Hardware-Oriented Block Ciphers, CHES 2009, LNCS 5747 (2008) 272-288. 
 
[11] F. Abed, E. List, S. Lucks, J.Wenzel, Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis of Reduced-round Simon, 
http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/526. (2013). 
 
[12] H. A. Alkhzaimi, M. M. Lauridsen, Cryptanalysis of the SIMON Family of Block Ciphers, 
https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/543.pdf. (2013). 
 
[13] J. Daemen, V. Rijmen, AES Proposal: Rijndael, The First Advanced Encryption Standard Candidate 
Conference. 
 
[14] R. Anderson, B. Biham, L. Knudsen, Serpent: A Proposal for the Advanced Encryption Standard, The 
First Advanced Encryption Standard Candidate Conference. 
 
[15] X. Zhao, S. Guo, F. Zhang, T. Wang, Z. Shi, H. Liu, K. Ji, H. J, Efficient Hamming Weight-based 
Side-channel Cube Attacks on PRESENT, Journal of Systems and Software 86(3) (2013) 728-743. 
 
[16] K. Zhang, J. Guan, B. Hu, D. Lin, Security Evaluation on Simeck against Zero Correlation Linear 
Cryptanalysis, Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2015/911. 
 
[17] K. Qiao, L. Hu, S. Sun, Differential Security Evaluation of Simeck with Dynamic Key-guessing 
Techniques, Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2015/902. 
 
[18] S. Kolbl, A. Roy, A Brief Comparison of SIMON and Simeck, Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 
2015/706. 
 
[19] F. Zhang, S. Guo, X. Zhao, T. Wang, J. Yang, F.-X. Standaert, D. Gu, A Framework for the Analysis 
and Evaluation of Algebraic Fault Attacks on Lightweight Block Ciphers, 
10.1109/TIFS.2016.2516905, (2016). 
 
International Journal of Computer Networks & Communications (IJCNC) Vol.10, No.4, July 2018 
90 
[20] L. Qin, H. Chen, Linear Hull Attack on Round-reduced Simeck with Dynamic Key-guessing 
Techniques, Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2016/066. 
 
[21] Z. Xiang, W. Zhang, Z. Bao, D. Lin, Applying MILP Method to Searching Integral Distinguishers 
based on Division Property for 6 Lightweight Block Ciphers, http://eprint.iacr.org/2016/857, (2016). 
 
[22] N. Bagheri, Linear Cryptanalysis of Reduced-round Simeck Variant, Cryptology ePrint Archive, 
Report 2015/716. 
 
[23] M. Blum, M. Luby, R. Rubinfield, Self-Testing/Correcting with Application to Numerical Problems, 
STOC (1990) 73-83. 
 
[24] I. Dinur, A. Shamir, Side Channel Cube Attacks on Block Ciphers, Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 
2009/127. 
 
[25] G. Bard, N. Courtois, J. Nakahara, P. Sepehrdad, B. Zhang, Algebraic, AIDA/Cube and Side-Channel 
Analysis of KATAN Family of Block Ciphers, INDOCRYPT. 
 
[26] S. Madakam, R. Ramaswamy and S. Tripathi, S., 2015. Internet of Things (IoT): A literature review. 
Journal of Computer and Communications, 3(05), pp.164. 
 
[27] A. Haroon, M. A. Shah, Y. Asim, W. Naeem, M. Kamran, Q. Javaid, 2016. Constraints in the IoT: 
The World in 2020 and Beyond, International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and 
Applications, Vol. 7, pp. 252-271. 
 
AUTHORS
 
Alya Geogiana Buja is a Ph.D. student at the Faculty of Information Technology and 
Communication, Universiti Teknikal Malaysia Melaka, Malaysia. Her research 
interests include information and network security. She involves actively in giving 
seminar and talk about information and security. 
 
 
Shekh Faisal Abdul-Latip is a Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Information 
Technology and Communication, Universiti Teknikal Malaysia Melaka, Malaysia. He 
received PhD degree in 2012 from the University of Wollongong, Australia, in the field 
of Symmetric-key Cryptography. Currently he is an executive committee member of 
Malaysian Society for Cryptology Research (MSCR) - a non-profit organization that 
promotes new ideas and activities in cryptology related areas in Malaysia. His research 
focuses on Cryptology (i.e. designing and breaking secret codes) and Information 
Security. 
 
Rabiah Ahmad is a Professor at the Faculty of Information Technology and 
Communication, Universiti Teknikal Malaysia Melaka, Malaysia. She received her PhD 
in Information Studies (health informatics) from the University of Sheffield, UK, and 
M.Sc. (information security) from the Royal Holloway University of London, UK. Her 
research interests include healthcare system security and information security 
architecture. She has delivered papers at various health informatics and information 
security conferences at national as well as international levels. She has also published 
papers in accredited national/international journals. Besides that, she also serves as a 
reviewer for various conferences and journals. 
